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In this article the authors analyse to what extent the objectives of the Council of the European Union (EU) and the EU Commission
are effectively realized through the ATA Directive. Authors believe that the choice for a Directive is likely not the most effective, while
for a substantial period potentially resulting in legal uncertainty regarding the scope of the Directive’s terminology and provisions.
The relationship with existing international (tax) treaty obligations is complex as well as with existing income tax Directives.
Moreover, the choice for a Directive puts the tax authorities – who have the primary initiative in applying its provisions – in a relative
weaker position since under EU law they cannot unlike taxpayers directly apply the Directive’s provisions. Finally, it can be
questioned where local tax authorities have the initiative, whether the EU Commission review and monitoring process will be sufficient
to safeguard a consistent application of the Directive’s provisions within the EU, creating a level playing field. In view of this, authors
conclude that a Regulation or alternatively a peer review mechanism may result in less legal uncertainty and a more effective
mechanism to realize the Council of the EU and the EU Commission’s objectives.
1 INTRODUCTION
In January this year, the European Union (EU)
Commission published a draft Directive,1 following
through on the Council of the EU’s policy decision to
implement the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) recommendations of Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project within the
EU context. This draft Directive introduces EU provi-
sions for the areas covered by the OECD BEPS project,
(1) hybrid mismatches, (2) Controlled Foreign
Corporation (CFC), (3) interest deduction limitation as
well as EU provisions for areas not covered by the
OECD BEPS project, (4) switch-over clause, (5) exit
taxation and (6) General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR).
The draft Directive has been approved on June 21,
2016.2
This Directive aims restoring a level playing field
between enterprises solely operating within one EU
Member State and enterprises operating in multiple EU
Member States and other countries. The latter category
is according to the EU Commission better able to reduce
their effective income tax rate through exploring differ-
ences between the income tax regimes of EU Member
States.3 Hence by issuing a Directive under Article 115
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (‘TFEU’), the EU
Commission takes the position that the balance between
fiscal autonomy on direct taxation and the functioning of
the internal market should be mitigated in favour of the
latter.4 It should be observed that in Eurowings,5 the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) allowed EU companies
to benefit from tax competition within the internal market.
Out of several options,6 the EU Commission has
chosen for proposing a Directive to the Council of the
EU. Below it is investigated whether a Directive is the
best available option to realize the goals as stated in the
preamble of the ATA Directive as well as other policy
statements made by the Council of the EU. In paragraph
2, first some introductory observations are made, nota-
bly regarding the asymmetry in which EU law impacts
corporate income taxation. Subsequently, in paragraph
3 all instruments available to the EU Commission to
realize the Council of the EU’s goals are analysed fol-
lowed by how the decision to propose a Directive relates
to the purpose of the BEPS project and EU internal
market. Next in paragraph 4 it is discussed whether
the Directive meets the subsidiarity and proportionality
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1 28 Jan. 2016, COM(2016) 26, to be further referred to as the ATA
Directive (Anti-Tax Avoidance).
2 The article incorporates developments up to 15 May 2016, except
that in this article no refernces are made to the draft ATA Directive.
3 Resulting from a lack of (1) coordination between EU Member
States, (2) harmonization of the tax base within EU Member States
or (3) unification of the tax base and eventually tax collection at
the EU level.
4 Implying that some differences between the income tax regimes
are mitigated through the ATA Directive.
5 ECJ 26 Oct. 1999, C-294/97 (Eurowings Luftverkehrs).
6 A Directive, a Regulation, a multilateral Treaty between EU
Member States and/or an EU monitoring group with peer review.
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tests under Article 115 TFEU. Subsequently, in para-
graphs 5 and 6 the implementation and appeal proce-
dures are highlighted, followed in paragraph 7 by a brief
discussion of potential conflicts with other (EU) tax law
and income tax treaties entered into by the Member
States. Thereafter paragraph 8 contains a brief discus-
sion on the consequences for the assessment of uncer-
tain tax positions under US Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP) and International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). This article is
concluded by a summary.
2 INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS
It is important to observe that applying current EU law in
the area of direct taxation may result in asymmetrical
consequences when determining the domestic taxable
base. Under EU law an EU Member State is obliged to
treat non-residents active on its domestic market through
the internal market, no worse than its domestic residents
not relying on the internal market. The reverse situation is
however not covered under EU law: an EU Member State
may treat its own residents7 not active on the internal
market less beneficial compared with non-residents8
which are active in this EU Member State through the
internal market. A Member State may thus discriminate
against its own residents and it is this asymmetric position
which amongst others facilitates EU cross border tax plan-
ning and is a location factor for setting up business within
the EU. This asymmetry manifests itself most clearly in the
determination of the taxable base and in fact in the alloca-
tion of the taxable base between EU Member States. Non-
residents which are under the same facts and circum-
stances are treated less advantageous than residents, will
in most instances enjoy a reduction in taxable base.
However, residents only operating domestically cannot
enjoy a reduction in their domestic taxable base which
international operating entities are able to enjoy by exploit-
ing differences in income tax regimes, primarily by using
legal entities resident in different jurisdictions between
which income is allocated. The ATA Directive only partly
addresses shifting or differences in determining the taxable
base between EU Member States, while it does not address
rate differences between EU Member States.9 So rate dif-
ferences, being a powerful incentive for tax planning, can
still exist on a domestic level within the EU and remain
unaffected by this Directive, especially where such rate has
cleared the State Aid threshold and falls outside the scope
of the Harmful tax competition criteria.10
This asymmetry in determining the taxable base also
benefits enterprises in jurisdictions outside the EU and
European Economic Region (EER). As of 1 January 1994
such enterprises in 3rd jurisdictions can in principle11 rely
on the EU freedom of capital. Hence, like any EU resident,
they can in principle avail themselves of the differences in
taxable base allocations as well as income tax rates between
different EU Member States. However, in the proposed
switch-over and CFC measures it maybe that low tax
regimes in 3rd jurisdictions are treated worse than similar
regimes within the EU, benefitting from other protections
under EU law.
One could say that this ATA Directive is to a certain
extent at the internal market level mirroring what the State
Aid provisions12 are covering at a domestic level: only
international operating companies have the opportunity
to benefit from differences between EU Member States’
income tax regimes.13 Where the State Aid provisions are
based on a specific provision in the TFEU, the ATA
Directive is however based on a general concept within
EU law (intervention at the EU level in case of ‘mal’func-
tioning of the internal market) and so one could ask
whether relying on such general principle may be a suffi-
cient legal basis for the ATA Directive. For example, the
Directive only targets tax planning between related enti-
ties, and so unrelated business entities operating in various
EU Member States enjoying the same benefits under the
same circumstances can continue to benefit from exploit-
ing differences. The latter is so far apparently not perceived
as unintended consequences and hence so far no correc-
tion mechanism seems warranted under EU law, all other
facts and circumstances being equal.14 Since the TFEU
without State Aid provisions would probably lack an effec-
tive mechanism to combat State Aid based on general EU
principles and provisions, one could subsequently ask
whether tax evasion as targeted by the ATA Directive
7 A resident corporate payer whose shares are owned by (a) resident
tax payer(s), active on its domestic market.
8 A resident corporate tax payer whose shares are owned by (a) resident
tax payer(s), active on both its domestic as well another EU Member
State’s market. Or a resident corporate tax payer whose shares are
owned by (a) non-resident tax payer(s), active in its domestic market
(and eventually in another EU Member State as well).
9 Rate differences are a key driver for exploiting difference between
income tax regimes, and so setting a minimum income tax rate
could help.
10 E.g. generic working innovation box regimes.
11 Unless the standstill provision of Art. 64, para. 1, TFEU can by
invoked by an EU Member State.
12 Arts 107–109 of the TFEU, declaring selective advantages through
state resources incompatible with the internal market where com-
petition has been or may be distorted and trade between EU
Member States may likely be affected.
13 As opposed to selective advantages granted to domestic residents
by one EU Member State.
14 E.g. an airline leasing aircrafts from an unrelated lessor (e.g. a
leasing companies owned by multiple airlines and leasing aircraft
to these multiple airlines whose shareholders do not qualify as
related) under an at arm’s length lease with local substance in a
low tax EU jurisdiction is not covered by the ATA Directive, while
the same transaction is potentially covered when the lessor is
related to the lessee airline, all other facts and circumstances
being the same. Such intercompany leasing transaction is relevant
for both the switch-over rule as well as the CFC rule (but only if it
qualifies as a financial lease. The CFC rule only covers financial
leases, while the Directive does not contain standards for qualify-
ing cross border lease in multiple jurisdictions). Being in scope for
both rules, only the CFC rule provides a safe harbor and thus
targets primarily wholly artificial establishments.
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would be better countered by a similar type of provision in
the TFEU.15
3 INSTRUMENT
3.1 Introduction
Both the EU Commission as well as the EU Council have
stated that they will implement the proposed measures
of the OECD BEPS project within the EU. In doing so
there are various legally binding instruments (‘hard law’)
they can use. Alternatively, they could follow the OECD
in setting up peer review groups on the various topics
covered by the BEPS project (‘soft law’) somewhat simi-
lar to the Global Forum Transparency and Exchange of
Information for tax purposes (‘GFTEI’). Even though
such arrangements through peer review are in principle
non-binding, the political dynamics as well as press
coverage generated by these peer review groups aim to
ensure that EU Member States implement domestic leg-
islation leading to a better and more level playing field.
3.2 ‘Soft Law’ Option
Within the EU context, a ‘soft law’ arrangement such as peer
review has a different dynamic compared with a ‘hard law’
arrangement such as a Directive or Regulation. A peer
review process is more inclusive in its set-up compared
with a Directive or Regulation. First, each EU Member
State has in principle an equal say, since there are no
corrections made for the number of inhabitants in any EU
Member State. Even though the approval of a Directive or
Regulation in the area of direct taxation is subject to unani-
mity, once that hurdle has been cleared, the larger EU
Member States16 could potentially through the EU
Commission have a relative bigger impact on the subse-
quentmonitoring of the domestic implementation or execu-
tion through for example infringement procedures.
Furthermore, a peer review process is outside the scope of
the ECJ and thus while on the one hand no legal proceed-
ings are available to challenge the outcome of such peer
review, on the other hand the ECJ’s role, having at times
issued rulings in the area of income taxation which some-
times seem contra dictionary, is not always resulting in the
level playing fieldmost EUMember States desire. A negative
aspect of peer review is that the direct democratic represen-
tation at the EU level in such process is relatively weak to
non-existent.17
Since no ‘soft law’ option has been pursued, the ‘hard’
law options are further discussed and qualified below.
3.3 Options in EU Legal Framework
The Treaty on the functioning of the EU provides in Article
28818 two hard law instruments through which direct
taxation issues can be addressed, a Directive based on
Article 115 TFEU or a Regulation based on Article 352
TFEU. Both instruments are prepared and drafted by the
EU Commission but in principle issued by the Council of
the EU, having legislative power. A proposed Directive is
subject to review by the European Parliament as well as the
national parliaments of the EU Member States.19 In the
area of direct taxation, a Directive or Regulation can only
be approved in the Council of the EU by unanimous vote.
Both instruments create definitions and terminology
which is distinct from the meaning of similar definitions
and terminology at a domestic level. Since both instru-
ments are based on authority vested in the TFEU, they
have an independent meaning within the TFEU context.
Hence definitions and terminology used in a Directive or
Regulation can not be equated with the domestic meaning
in an EU Member State.
The legal consequences of a Directive and a
Regulation differ. A Regulation is binding in its entirety
and directly applicable in all EU Member States to all EU
residents and public institutions or bodies covered
under the Regulation. Since a Regulation is vested in
the TFEU, it has a somewhat stronger footing than
domestic legislation and thus is in a sense overriding
domestic legislation and treaties entered into by a
Member State.20 A Regulation can be challenged by
starting21 an annulment procedure with the ECJ22
15 This would be a challenge for income taxation however, since EU
law has no direct exclusive competence in the area of direct
taxation.
16 Larger EU Member states may assign relatively more EU civil
servants than smaller EU Member States and have relatively more
EU Commissioners compared with smaller EU Member States. As
a consequence, they may have a relative bigger impact on the
monitoring the implementation and execution of a Directive or
Regulation pursuant to Art. 17, para. 1, TEU once it has been
adopted.
17 There is no democratic elected EU institution involved in the peer
review, hence one should find the democratic basis for such review
in the authority vested in domestic Parliaments.
18 Art. 288 TFEU reads: ‘(i) to exercise the Union’s competences, the
institutions shall adopt regulations, directives, decisions, recom-
mendations and opinions; (ii) a regulation shall have general
application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applic-
able in all Member States; (iii) a directive shall be binding, as to the
result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is
addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice
of form and methods; (iv) a decision shall be binding in its entirety
upon those to whom it is addressed; (v) recommendations and
opinions shall have no binding force.’
19 The procedure is further elaborated in Protocol (No 2) to the
TFEU on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality. This procedure is not discussed in further detail.
20 Art. 352 TFEU reads amongst others: ‘if action by the Union
should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies
defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in
the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary
powers, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the
Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European
Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures.’
21 By the EC, the European Parliament and/or EU Member States.
22 The ECJ (i) reviews the legality of the acts of the institutions of the
European Union (annulment procedure), (ii) ensures that the
Member States comply with obligations under the Treaties (infrin-
gement procedure), and (iii) interprets European Union law at the
request of the national courts and tribunals (preliminary rulings).
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should the regulation been issued in violation of pri-
mary material EU or formal EU law, such as procedural
defect, lack of authority or misuse of authority.23 The
interpretation of a Regulation insofar applied domesti-
cally may be subject to preliminary rulings with the ECJ
to be submitted by the local courts.
A Directive however is only binding upon the EU
Member States which are free in choosing the form and
methods for implementing the Directive. EU citizens
and entities can directly apply an EU Directive in the
event EU Member States have incorrectly or not timely
implemented the Directive to the detriment of an EU
resident. Contrary to an EU Regulation, public institu-
tions cannot directly apply an EU Directive.24 Since the
provisions of a Directive can only be implemented in
domestic law, they remain in principle25 of a lower
ranking than provisions in international treaties to
which a Member State is party. So even though the
authority to issue a Directive is vested in a generally
higher ranking treaty, the domestic provisions resulting
from its implementation rank below provisions from
international treaties.
Challenges to the domestic implementation of a
Directive are brought before a domestic court which
can ask the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, which either
challenges the domestic implementation of part or all of
the Directive or in rare circumstances all or part of the
Directive itself being for example in violation with EU
law.26 Where a domestic court let provisions in interna-
tional (tax) treaties prevail over the local provision based
on the ATA Directive, the EU Member States may violate
EU law,27,28
Alternatively, all EU Member States can upon initia-
tive of for example the Council of the EU or EU Member
States enter into a separate international treaty. Such
treaty, even though rooted in the TFEU, would function
as a separate treaty next to the TFEU, and needs to be
ratified by the governments of all EU Member States
before it can take effect in all EU Member States. Such
ratification procedures can be lengthy and complex
especially where a treaty enters into force once all
Member States have ratified the treaty under their
domestic procedures. Alternatively, in the event such
treaty enters into force once a minimum number of
Member States have ratified such treaty, a level playing
field is still not yet ensured in all EU Member States.
However, this can be solved by designating for instance
jurisdiction to the ECJ to give judgment concerning the
interpretation of the treaty.29 Likewise, they could create
an institution which shall oversee the application of the
treaty and ensures a correct application of it.
3.4 Chosen Instrument
The Council of the EU and the EU Commission have
chosen a Directive for implementing part of the OECD
recommendations of BEPS project within the EU con-
text. At first sight issuing a Regulation seems not possi-
ble, since an EU Regulation can only be issued for
matters where the EU has exclusive competence or
legislates extensively30,31which is not directly the case
for direct income taxation. However, Article 352
TFEU32 allows to adopt appropriate measures to attain
one of the objectives set out in the Treaties even when
the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers.
One could argue thus that even though no explicit
power has vested at the EU level this article nevertheless
provides a legal basis for issuing a Regulation provided
all procedural requirements are met. These procedural
23 Art. 263 TFEU.
24 E.g. ECJ 26 Feb. 1986, case 152/84 (Marshall).
25 Depending on the law of the EU Member State, which may or may
not have provisions which prioritize international treaties over
domestic provisions.
26 E.g. ECJ 8 Apr. 2014, joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12
(Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger).
27, Art. 351 reads: ‘(i) the rights and obligations arising from agree-
ments concluded before 1 January 1958 or, for acceding States,
before the date of their accession, between one or more Member
States on the one hand, and one or more third countries on the
other, shall not be affected by the provisions of the Treaties. (ii) to
the extent that such agreements are not compatible with the
Treaties, the Member State or States concerned shall take all
appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established.
Member States shall, where necessary, assist each other to this
end and shall, where appropriate, adopt a common attitude. (iii)
In applying the agreements referred to in the first paragraph,
Member States shall take into account the fact that the advantages
accorded under the Treaties by each Member State form an integral
part of the establishment of the Union and are thereby inseparably
linked with the creation of common institutions, the conferring of
powers upon them and the granting of the same advantages by all
the other Member States.’
28 ECJ 10 Mar. 1998, joined cases C-364/95 and C-365/95 (T-port)
sets principles for when EU law provisions can be deprived of
effect due to international obligations towards 3rd countries (see
para. 61).
29 Art. 272 TFEU.
30 See Art. 288 TFEU.
31 The same applies for a Directive.
32 Art. 352 reads as follows:
1. If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the
framework of the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain
one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties
have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, acting
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt
the appropriate measures. Where the measures in question are
adopted by the Council in accordance with a special legislative
procedure, it shall also act unanimously on a proposal from
the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the
European Parliament.
2. Using the procedure for monitoring the subsidiarity principle
referred to in Art. 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union, the
Commission shall draw national Parliaments’ attention to pro-
posals based on this Article.
3. Measures based on this Article shall not entail harmonization
of Member States’ laws or regulations in cases where the
Treaties exclude such harmonization.
4. This Article cannot serve as a basis for attaining objectives
pertaining to the common foreign and security policy and any
acts adopted pursuant to this Article shall respect the limits set
out in Article 40, second paragraph, of the Treaty on
European Union.
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steps are more or less in line with the procedural steps
for issuing a Directive, of which the unanimity and
subsidiarity33 requirements are the most important.
The benefits of issuing a Regulation would be twofold:
a directly binding obligation to all private and public
actors in the EU and a reduced risk of an inconsistent
implementation of Directive provisions between the
domestic laws of EU Member States. There are no public
sources available on why the EU Commission did not
opt for a Regulation.
Article 115 TFEU authorizes the Council of the EU to
issue Directives for the approximation of EU Member
States laws, regulations and administrative provisions
where they affect the functioning of the internal market.
When proposing a Directive, the EU Commission
should verify whether the draft Directive meets the
subsidiarity and proportionality tests, since direct taxa-
tion is not directly governed by EU laws. It needs to be
demonstrated that not further approximating laws, reg-
ulations and administrative provisions in the BEPS area,
is adversely affecting the functioning of the internal
market. These tests are further discussed in the next
paragraph.
The ATA Directive differs in its perspective from the
earlier issued Directives in the areas of direct taxation.
The Directives implemented so far,34 aimed to eliminate
obstacles in the EU Member States’ domestic local
income and dividend tax laws. Hence these Directives
allowed for exemptions of or roll over relief from
domestic taxation for qualifying transactions between
Member States, provided certain condition are met,
while simultaneously providing safeguards against tax
evasion and tax avoidance through an anti-abuse rule. In
other words, these Directives addressed an internal mar-
ket deemed not functioning well enough.
Under these Directives bona fide tax payers executing
qualifying transactions are the principle actors when
relying on the Directive, while tax authorities will
check whether a qualifying transactions may qualify as
tax evasion under the anti-abuse rule. Tax payers have a
clear incentive to challenge domestic tax provisions and
regulations which are not in line with these Directives or
have not been implemented in accordance with EU law,
because they directly benefit from the relief granted.
Hence tax payers triggered a multitude of cases35
which nearly all resulted in eliminating domestic obsta-
cles when executing qualifying cross border transactions
covered by these Directives and setting boundaries what
is to be perceived as tax evasion under EU law.36
The ATA Directive has an inverse set-up compared
with implemented Directives, first of all addressing mul-
tiple topics instead of one topic per Directive as earlier
directives did. Since the ATA Directive aims to ensure
within the EU that income tax is paid where profits and
value are generated, it is a correction on the existing
status quo. So the starting premise is that even though
direct taxation is not directly governed by EU law,
domestic tax provisions may unintendedly adversely
affect the functioning of the internal market, because
the interaction of domestic tax systems across various
EU Member States may result in an overall taxation
which is not in line with where economic value is
generated. In other words, this Directive addresses an
internal market deemed functioning too good to be in
accordance with primary EU law.
This is a novel and far-reaching concept in direct
taxation, likely subject to challenge and if upheld
could provide the Council of the EU and/or EU
Commission with more power in the area of direct
taxation. However, it can be questioned whether under
Article 5 Treaty of the European Union (TEU)37 EU
Member States have indeed conferred such competences
to the EU in the area of direct income taxation. The ATA
Directive, absent a distinction between the subject and
object of direct income taxation in a given EU Member
State and absent a mechanism for resolving conflicts in
subjects and objects of taxation between multiple EU
Member States, other than the EU Arbitration
Convention, in essence forces a correction of the taxable
base (the object) in (a) (multiple) Member States. Hence
the basis under the ATA Directive seems solely based on
the assessment of the functioning of the EU internal
market by the Council of the EU and/or EU
Commission.38
Now implemented, tax authorities are the principal
actors having a clear incentive for applying the princi-
ples laid down in this Directive, while tax payers will
look for safe harbors for transactions covered by the
Directive. The tables have thus been turned compared
with the other Directives covering direct income taxa-
tion. The tax authorities are at a relative disadvantage
compared with tax payers, because where domestic pro-
visions have been implemented to the detriment of tax
authorities they cannot directly rely on the ATA
Directive’s provisions, while taxpayers in the reverse
33 Art. 5 TEU.
34 The Merger Directive, 1990/434/EEC amended by 2005/19/EC,
the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, 1990/435/EEC amended by
2003/123/EC, 2014/86/EU and 2015/121/EU and the Interest
and Royalty Directive, 2003/49/EC.
35 See e.g. joined cases C-283/94, C-291/94 and C-292/94
(Denkavit International BV, VITIC Amsterdam BV and
Voormeer BV) and C-250/95 (Futura participations SA).
36 Anti-abuse concepts under EU law will in principle differ from
domestic anti-abuse concepts.
37 Art. 5, para. 2, TEU reads: ‘under the principle of conferral, the
Union shall act only within the limits of the competences con-
ferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the
objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the
Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.’
38 Pursuant to Art. 263 TFEU, should an EU Member State be of the
view that Art. 5 TEU has been violated, they should within two
months of publication of the ATA Directive file an annulment
procedure with the ECJ. In a later stage the same arguments can
be put forward in the other appeal procedures.
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situation can. Legal challenges will further clarify this
mechanic.
An important question is whether a Directive cover-
ing simultaneously multiple topics related by the
OECD’s BEPS project as well as independent EU topics,
is in its current form the optimal legal instrument under
EU law to achieve the Council of the EU and EU
Commission’s stated objectives. The ATA Directive ‘uni-
tes’ and contains six different measures of which some
seem better suited for implementing through a Directive
than others. Where measures are relatively targeted,
such as those relating to hybrid mismatches, exit taxa-
tion and interest limitation deduction, the choice for a
Directive seems right especially where the concepts laid
down in the Directive do not much deviate from domes-
tic similar concepts. However, where provisions do have
a more general character and nature, such as the CFC,
switch-over clause and the GAAR, domestic concepts of
EU Member States in the same general areas covered by
the ATA Directive differ from the EU concepts. As a
result, when implementing the Directive, it is far from
clear whether and how these EU and domestic concepts
will align and so increasing the risk of litigation at a
domestic level. A Regulation or a peer review mechan-
ism for implementing general anti-abuse concepts, may
be a better and more effective measure for all actors, tax
payers as well as tax authorities, because a consistent
application in all EU Member States is more likely and
thus may ensure a more level playing field.
4 SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
Since the EU has no exclusive competence in the area of
direct taxation, a proposed directive should meet the
standards of Articles 5 and 115 TFEU, the subsidiarity
and proportionality tests.39 Regarding the ATA
Directive, the tax evasion this Directive aims to combat,
is in practice almost always a result of differences
between the EU Member States’ direct income tax sys-
tems, where tax payers look for differences in determin-
ing the taxable subject and object as well as differences
in qualifying legal instruments.40 As discussed in the
preceding paragraph, the Council of the EU and the
EU Commission are of the view that competence to
regulate in this area has been conferred to them by EU
Member States. These grounds are likely to be tested by
taxpayers given the relative narrow playing field in
which the Council of the EU and EU Commission
operate. Even though the ECJ has been relatively reluc-
tant in accepting challenges to provisions in an EU
Directive based on the subsidiarity principle, in the
area of direct taxation there have yet been no challenges
to a Directive based on the violation of the subsidiarity
principle litigated and this thus remains uncharted
territory.
The EU Commission believes that implementing the
recommendations of the OECD BEPS project and tack-
ling cross-border tax avoidance can not be left to the EU
Member States on their own; where the objective is to
adopt solutions that function for the internal market as a
whole and improve the internal market’s resilience
against (internal and external) aggressive tax planning,
the appropriate response is coordinated initiatives at the
EU level. In the EU Commission’s view the subsidiarity
test is thus met41 since a domestic implementation of
the OECD’s BEPS recommendations – which all EU
Member States have committed to implement – and
the additional topics tackling cross-border tax avoidance
have by definition a cross border dimension, hence a
balancing of divergent interests within the internal mar-
ket through a Directive is warranted. Moreover, accord-
ing to the EU Commission in the event the OECD’s
BEPS recommendations are implemented through the
acquis, tax payers can have legal certainty that they
comply with EU law.42 In our view, an alternative
argument could be that even though EU Member
States have not transferred any authority regarding the
set-up (who is subject to direct income taxation and
what is the object of taxation) of their income tax
systems to the EU, the way income is allocated among
EU Member States, may fall within the scope of Article
115 TFEU because this may affect the functioning of the
internal market. The EU Commission does however not
explain why the measures not covered in the OECD
BEPS initiative but included in the ATA Directive also
meet the subsidiarity test, but probably their view is that
this test is met as well because these measures are cover-
ing more or less the same areas as the OECD BEPS
recommendations, especially where the taxable base as
opposed to being reduced may be broadened as a result.
Where the prior tax Directives were aimed at elim-
inating domestic obstacles potentially violating the EU
fundamental freedoms,43 the ATA Directive imposes
measures based on a consensus reached by the
Council of the EU in adopting the OECD BEPS project’s
recommendations as well as promoting its own EU
initiatives. The ATA Directive mostly targets the out-
come of specific or multiple transactions, for example
the total effective taxation of the income relating to a
dividend or a lease, instead of a specific transaction44 or
event45 within the internal market between actors in two
or more Member States, for example a dividend
39 A Regulation should meet these criteria too, but this is not further
discussed given the choice for a Directive.
40 See for instance Arnaud de Graaf, Paul de Haan & Maarten de
Wilde, Fundamental Change in Countries’ Corporate Tax Framework
Needed to Properly Address BEPS, 42 Intertax 306 (2014).
41 28 Jan. 2016, COM (2016) 26, 2016/0011 (CNS), page 4.
42 See page 4 bottom, of the Explanatory memorandum to the draft
ATA Directive.
43 Free movement of capital and freedom of establishment.
44 E.g. dividend, royalty or interest payments.
45 E.g. (de)merger.
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distribution or a lease between related companies. This
is reflected in the proposed measures included in the
ATA Directive which vary in focus between a specific
transaction or event, the outcome of various transactions
within a group, a specific state within a group of com-
panies to a general anti-abuse provision. The proposed
measures intervene in the working of the internal mar-
ket and reverse the outcome for specific transactions or
for actors on the internal market which primarily take
advantage of the differences in income tax rates. In our
view this approach sets a high bar for whether measures
included in the ATA Directive meet the subsidiarity and
proportionality tests.46 A measure combatting tax eva-
sion with potential adverse effects on the functioning of
the internal market,47 is in our view only acceptable
under EU law if accompanied by relief for bona fide
actors on this market.48 The ATA Directive seems short
on such safe harbor mechanisms.
The ATA Directive is a variety of related topics united
in one Directive. First, this raises the question on how
the subsidiarity and proportionality tests should be
applied. Is the Directive itself or each of the different
measures the object of these tests, given the variety of
the provisions? In our view each measure should be
tested on its own, because if the Directive as a whole
should be tested measures clearly not meeting the sub-
sidiarity test can piggy back on those meeting the test.
One can further argue whether the subsidiarity and
proportionality tests can be met when a measure delib-
erately creates distortions for the functioning of the
internal market, especially when there is insufficient
relief for bona fide actors and transactions suffering
from these distortions.49 An example is the proposed
interest limitation rule, which resembles rules some EU
Member States already have included in their domestic
income tax laws. An interest limitation rule implemen-
ted in domestic law – thus excluded from the compe-
tence of the EU – should satisfy the basic principles of
EU law, primarily the fundamental freedoms provisions
and the proportionality test; the subsidiarity test is not
part of the analysis. Since a domestic interest limitation
rule is generally set-up as a generic measure not discri-
minating against resident and non-resident tax payers,
there is in principle no conflict with any of the funda-
mental freedoms. However, where the interest limitation
rule is introduced based on Article 115 TFEU the mea-
sure should now be tested under the subsidiarity prin-
ciple where the functioning of the internal market is
affected, a slightly different test than the one under the
fundamental freedoms. In the former the relevant test is
whether a domestic provision is equally applicable and
has a similar effect for resident and non-resent actors
alike. In the latter the resident tax payer as bench mark
falls out of the equation, the primary benchmark has
now become the functioning of the internal market. And
under this test the proposed interest limitation could
probably adversely affect the functioning of the internal
market, for example when non-deductible interest in the
debtor’s EU Member State remains fully taxed in the
creditor’s EU Member State and adversely impacts the
credit rating of the debtor.50 Where the interest is taxed
against a sufficiently high effective income tax rate, relief
could be granted avoiding distortions.
Another concern is where an EU Member State can
change its direct income taxation rules and regulations
while also directly impacting the taxation in another EU
Member State under the provisions based on this
Directive. It raises the question whether the subsidiarity
and proportionality principles have been met which can
be illustrated by how the switch-over and CFC rules can
work out. When an EU Member State lowers its statu-
tory income tax rate, this may impact a parent resident
in another EU Member State when it has a subsidiary
based in the first mentioned Member State. Where this
parent is subject to a substantial higher statutory income
tax rates compared with the rate applicable in the sub-
sidiary’s Member State, the switch-over and CFC rules
can kick in when the effective income tax rate drops
below 40% of the statutory or effective rate of the parent
company. So by implementing the ATA Directive,
executing general tax policy in one Member State51
could affect the application of income taxation in
another Member State. Such a move by one EU
Member State will in our view affect the functioning of
the internal market because the parent in the other
jurisdiction will be either confronted with higher
income tax on assets and/or activities performed in
another jurisdiction or alternatively will reorganize
these assets and/or activities as well as distribute income
out of this Member State prior to the rate change.
Absent any clarity on how the accumulated earnings
prior to such rate change will be treated it is also unclear
whether the proportionality test has been met as well.
Finally, there is a risk that in the process leading up
to the Directive, a formality has been omitted: so far
there has been no impact assessment made public while
this a requirement under chapter III of the Better
46 See C-294/97 (Eurowings Luftverkehrs).
47 And potentially enlarging the combined taxable bases of the
Member States involved.
48 See e.g. C-43/00 (Andersen og Jensen Aps).
49 See e.g. C-254/04 (Test Claimants Thin Gap GLO).
50 A lower credit rating could increase the debtor’s borrowing cost
and force creditors keeping higher capital reserves, making lending
to such companies slightly less attractive.
51 Prior to the ATA Directive this effect occurred as well, but without
the ATA Directive EU Member States have the liberty to amend
their income tax laws where deemed appropriate provided general
EU law is not violated. Under the ATA Directive this triggers an
automatic and direct effect, only to be resolved through lowering
its own statutory income tax rate. An example illustrating such
effects are the recent changes in statutory income tax rates of
various jurisdictions accommodating the Japanese CFC rules and
the ensuing negotiations.
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Regulation Guidelines.52,53 Absent such impact assess-
ment, national Parliaments will be limited in their ability
to judge whether the subsidiarity and proportionality
tests have been met.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
After the approval by the Council of the EU, the ATA
Directive needs to be implemented in the domestic
legislation by the Member States before 1 January
2019.54 Generally, a Directive introduces or refers to
terminology which is rooted in EU law, and thus cannot
be explained by the terminology’s context and meaning
under the EU Member State’s domestic law. Moreover,
the procedure under which the Directive is ‘enacted’, is
not akin to regular legislative procedures by Member
States. The Directive has not been reviewed by an inde-
pendent body providing comments to prior drafts while
there is also no formal legislative history similar to EU
Member States’ Parliamentary proceedings. Documents
published while preparing a Directive,55 have limited
formal status under EU law, while most of them are
not made public. The legislative procedures are some-
what opaque.
The domestic legislator will follow the local proce-
dures for enacting a law proposal incorporating the
provisions of the ATA Directive. Each Member State is
bound by the minimum level of protection this
Directive proscribes for safeguarding the domestic
tax base but is free to implement higher standards of
protection. This discretionary authority can lead to
differences in taxation not covered by the ATA
Directive falling outside the scope of the ATA
Directive. This raises various practical concerns.
First, these higher level of protections need to be
tested against the fundamental freedoms and other
general EU law provisions, like any regular (income
tax) provision. Next, if the terminology is based on
the ATA Directive, but the level of protections goes
further than what the ATA Directive requires, the
question arises which court renders the final verdict
on the scope of the terminology. This should likely be
the ECJ based on case law rendered in the
Netherlands,56 but in other countries the outcome
may be different.
6 INTERPRETATION
The basis for implementation in domestic law will be the
terminology and its meaning under EU law. However,
some of the terminology used is ambiguous, for example
is Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and
Amortization (EBITDA) in all Member States determined
in the same manner,57 especially where the accounting
under income taxation differs from the accounting for
book purposes. And even though the ATA Directive
contains definitions of the most important terms used
therein, it remains uncertain whether this captures all
the possible varieties arising in the Member States upon
implementation. Moreover many terms are not defined,
creating the risk that such terms are not applied con-
sistently across the EU because domestic courts may in
first instances follow the domestic scope and
interpretation.58 The ATA Directive lacks a mechanism
to ensure a consistent application of its terminology in
all Member States.59,60
An uncertainty is also the legal basis of the
Directive. It can be questioned whether this directive,
based on Article 115 TFEU, complies with the princi-
ple of conferral as set out in Article 5, paragraphs 1 and
2, TEU. Taxpayers may request the ECJ to issue a
preliminary ruling on whether, in the absence of a
valid legal basis, the ATA Directive is valid. Although
any declaration invalidating a directive will, in princi-
ple, be backdated to the date on which the directive
came into force, several years are likely to elapse before
such a request can be considered and a ruling issued.
Hence not just the legal basis might be questioned but
it may also infringe on the EU fundamental freedoms
or other provisions of primary EU law. For example,
when the subsidiarity test is not judged to be met when
under part or all of the Directive itself or its implemen-
tation in one Member State violates the fundamental
freedoms. Clarity will only arise once the ECJ has
rendered verdict.
The domestic rules resulting from the implementa-
tion of the ATA Directive will first be applied by the
52 Better Regulation Guidelines dated 19 May 2015 and issued in
Strassbourg, COM(2015) 215 final.
53 Such deficiency can make a Directive in its entirety subject to
challenge by EU Member States and their parliaments under an
annulment procedure.
54 Dutch State Secretary of Finance stated in a letter of 13 May 2016
to the Lower house of the Dutch Parliament that 1 Jan. 2018 is
proposed as the date of application.
55 ECJ 14 Dec. 2005, C-170/05 (Denkavit).
56 C-28/95 (Leur Bloem).
57 Even though the accounting rules are fairly standardized through
EU Directives 78/660/EEG, 83/349/EEG and 2006/43/EG abol-
ished and amended by 2013/34/EU as well as Regulation (EC)
No 1601/2000, there is no certainty or mechanism to ensure that
the methodology is applied consistently across the EU, especially
since the required detail in the accounting rules differ depending
on the size of the reporting entity (the categories are small, med-
ium, large) and thus not all companies are required to report
EBITDA.
58 Based on case law, rules need to be clear, precise and predictive,
C-282/12 (Italcar).
59 An illustrative quirk is that the ATA Directive applies to taxpayers
that are subject to corporate income tax in one or more Member
States. Hybrid entities seem not covered in the state where such
entities are transparent under their domestic tax law.
60 E.g. the determination of taxable income of a permanent establish-
ment may differ between the state where the legal entity is a tax
resident and where the permanent establishment operates, which can
for example impact the interest limitation or hybrid mismatch rules.
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local tax authorities and subsequently challenged by the
taxpayer. The initiative to effect these rules lies with the
competent income tax inspector for the tax payer and so
the ATA Directive relies for its effectiveness on the
judgment and competence of the local income tax
inspector. This is a different setting compared with the
other income tax directives, where tax payers under EU
law61 can directly rely on the Directive when filing a
request for relief at source or refund by challenging
domestic provisions, which would then be subsequently
handled by the tax authorities. This difference is impor-
tant since an income tax inspector can not directly rely
on the ATA Directive, while it has a discretionary
authority when challenging a certain income tax posi-
tion. Challenges to provisions following from the ATA
Directive will start at the domestic level and move up to
the ECJ insofar domestic tax courts refer the matter to
the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. Where a local court
deems the provisions clear (acte claire), there will be no
preliminary ruling filed with the ECJ. Although the EU
Commission will initiate a review process three years
after its implementation, it can be questioned whether
this is sufficient for ensuring that local income tax
inspectors as well as local courts apply the domestic
provisions based on the ATA Directive consistently,
especially given the relative long time it takes to get
final clarity.
Legal challenges to provisions following from the
ATA Directive may take many years before clarity will
be shed on the scope of the new provisions. First,
income tax returns need to be filed after the close of a
financial year and may generally upon request be
extended with six to twelve months on their regular
deadline. Next income tax inspectors need to review
the return and challenge a position taken by a tax
payer, which will subsequently start the appeal proce-
dure under the domestic law of a Member State, even-
tually to be extended with a reference for a preliminary
ruling to the ECJ followed by a final verdict.62 The
entire appeal procedure may easily take four to six
years after the date of submission of an income tax
return, which is typically six to twenty months after
the close of a taxpayers’ financial year.
All in all, it can easily take five to eight years after the
implementation of the ATA Directive in domestic law
before clarity on the scope of a domestic provision based
on the Directive will be shed. This is more or less
consistent with the implementation of the other income
tax Directives, albeit that where the relief is available
through an administrative request, procedures challen-
ging the rejection of such requests typically start prior to
filing an income tax return. Since the ATA Directive is
driven by combatting tax evasion, the likely longer lead
time for challenges is more cumbersome compared with
the other income tax Directives.
A potential side effect of a lack of coordination and
monitoring is that like provisions from any Directive,
the ATA Directive provisions may not be consistently
applied63 throughout the EU. Where a Directive elim-
inates distortions in domestic law this is burden, but the
benefits taxpayers reap from a correct application of the
provisions is a sufficient countervailing power ensuring
consistent application throughout the EU. However,
where an abuse of law or tax evasion concept defined
at the EU level – like in the ATA Directive – may be
inconsistently applied through the EU, the lack of a
sufficient strong countervailing power seems a material
deficiency. There is a serious risk that concepts defined
at the EU level are not equally applied by domestic tax
authorities and thus are not consistently applied
throughout the EU.
7 CONFLICTS
The ATA Directive may conflict with other EU (tax)
laws and (income tax) treaties entered into by EU
Member States. However, the impact of international
treaties in relation to Directives has not yet fully crys-
talized. First of all Article 351 TFEU64 grandfathers
treaties existing before 1 January 1958 or the date of
accession of new EU members states, but at the same
time imposes the obligation to bring the provisions in
these treaties in accordance with EU law. All new
treaties after 1 January 1958 (the founders) or the
accession date (all other Member States) are in princi-
ple overruled by EU law because they must be compa-
tible with EU law.65 Next, it is unclear whether treaties
which are compatible with EU law before a Directive
has been issued, but subsequently become incompati-
ble with the Directive should be grandfathered as well.
The EC Commission seems of the view that this is the
case, but the ECJ seems to have a different view.66
61 See e.g. C-375/98 (Epson Europe BV).
62 The average duration of references for a preliminary ruling in 2015
was 15.3 months, see ECJ Press Release 34/16, dated 18 Mar. 2016.
63 This is relevant for all EU Directives.
64 See Art. 351 TFEU.
65 This applies for example to both Investment Protection
Agreements as well as Income Tax treaties. Now the UK opted
for a Brexit, all new agreements to be entered with the UK as a
third country must be in accordance with EU law, while it is
unclear what would happen to the existing agreements (those
existing prior to the founding of the EC with the founding mem-
bers, those with EU Member States prior to the UK joining the EU
as well as those entered into while the UK was member of the EU).
The manoeuvring room for the UK for entering into international
treaties with the EU Member States remains indirectly driven by
EU law.
66 ECJ 10 Mar. 1998, joined cases C-364/95 and C-365/95 (T-port),
limiting grandfathering only to international treaties concluded
before the EC Treaty and subsequent amendments, provided the
third country derives benefit from such treaty. The same seems to
apply to international treaties existing prior to joining the EU.
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7.1 Other EU Directives
A key open item is how to deal with conflicts between
the ATA Directive and the existing EU income tax
Directives.67 Areas of potential conflict are the appli-
cation of the Parent Subsidiary Directive and Merger
Directive in relation to the switch-over, CFC rule and
the GAAR rules. First, the relationship between the
anti-abuse provisions in the Parent Subsidiary
Directive and Merger Directive with the GAAR rule
in the ATA Directive is not clear. Is the GAAR the
general rule overriding the anti-abuse provision based
on the other Directives? Or should the GAAR be seen
as complimentary to the anti-abuse provisions based
on these Directives, in the sense that if a taxpayer
meets any of the anti-abuse provisions based on the
other Directives, the underlying transaction or series
of transactions relating there to can not be captured
under the GAAR? Another uncertainty is that where a
taxpayer relies on the Parent Subsidiary Directive or
Merger Directive and is entitled to relief, whether
such relief can be rolled back based on the switch-
over or CFC rules in the ATA Directive. Here again, it
is unclear in the event multiple Directives may apply
to a given fact pattern whether the ATA Directive is
complimentary or subsidiary to the existing
Directives.
7.2 EU Arbitration Convention68
The EU Arbitration Convention establishes a proce-
dure under which double taxation between associated
enterprises – resulting from an upward adjustment
made by tax authorities in one EU Member States
while not followed by a corresponding downward
adjustment in the other EU Member State – is
resolved through a binding obligation of both
Member States to eliminate double taxation from
such adjustment. The convention first stipulates that
tax authorities have the authority to apply the at
arm’s length standard to commercial and financial
transactions between related parties in different
Member States and may adjust such transactions
when they do not meet this standard. Next, in the
event the related parties and their tax authorities
cannot reach an agreement regarding these adjust-
ments, the convention provides a mechanism to
resolve such conflict, eventually through an advisory
commission. The convention set its own terms within
the terms of the domestic appeal framework of the
country where the tax payer is challenging the adjust-
ments. Depending on the circumstances first the
domestic appeal procedures may need to have been
completed before any arbitration procedure under
this Convention can be finalized, so that a binding
arbitration may take between five and ten years to
complete, which outcome needs to be implemented
irrespective time limits prescribed by domestic laws.
In practice this Convention so far has been applied in
a few cases.
This Convention has no immediate relevance for the
ATA Directive, since the Convention’s application is tied
to transfer pricing corrections, which are not the object
of the latter Directive. However, where as a result of the
application of provisions based on the ATA Directive,
conditions are imposed upon related parties which differ
from those which would have been made between unre-
lated parties, one could perhaps argue that the
Convention should provide relief. Moreover, this
Convention showcases legal mechanisms, albeit slow,
that avoid double taxation while respecting each EU
member independent’s authority regarding income
taxation.
8 AUDIT ASSESSMENTS
The newly introduced open norms in the ATA Directive
may complicate the audit assessment of uncertain tax
positions. Enterprises, especially those applying US
GAAP and IFRS, need to address uncertain income tax
positions under their applicable audit rules. Generally
speaking within the parameters69 set for an audit, a tax
benefit resulting from an uncertain position may be
recognized if it is ‘more likely than not’ that such tax
position will be sustained upon audit (‘recognition
threshold’). If so the next step is under most audit
concepts determining for what amount the tax benefit
should be recognized.
Depending on the legal status under the applicable
tax laws, a tax ruling70 entered into with a tax adminis-
tration can in principle take the uncertainty out of an
income tax position and thus ensure that a tax benefit
can be fully accounted for.71 Alternatively, third-parties
can issue an opinion on whether the more likely than
not threshold is met in a particular fact pattern, on
which the auditor may rely during the audit process.
When implementing the ATA Directive, the conse-
quences for the authority and the ability of tax admin-
istrations to issue an Advance Tax Ruling (ATR) or
Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) on the topics affected
by this Directive are unclear. The ATA Directive intro-
duces various concepts rooted in EU law directly affect-
ing the application of provisions in domestic income
67 Below we will only address the existing income tax directives.
68 Convention 90/436/EEC
69 The various materiality threshold under the audit rules.
70 Through an ATR or APA, the tax authorities and a tax payer reach
a mutual agreement or get a binding confirmation from the tax
authorities on the application of domestic income tax provisions to
a given fact pattern and circumstances disclosed by the tax payer.
71 Tax ruling may be issued under specific assumptions and condi-
tions which should be validated by a tax payer during the audit
process.
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tax. Hence an income tax inspector, when applying such
domestic income tax provision, needs to address and
interpret these new concepts. Local guidance in either
the legislative history relating to the implementation of
the ATA Directive or jurisprudence is likely of limited
help. Moreover, absent a legislative history at the EU
level on which one can rely,72 uncertainty and unclarity
regarding the meaning and scope of concepts intro-
duced in the ATA Directive, can only be finally clarified
by the ECJ. So tax authorities may become limited in
their ability to issue ATRs and APAs on topics affected
by the ATA Directive. This equally applies to third
parties when requested to issue opinions. The above
issue is particularly cumbersome under the agreed
switch-over and CFC rules as well as the GAAR rule.
9 SUMMARY
This article explains how Member States can choose
from a variety of instruments when seeking to adopt
anti-avoidance measures within the European Union.
While the EU Commission and Council have opted for
a directive for this purpose, the OECD/G20 have shown
a preference for soft-law arrangements in the non-treaty-
related BEPS measures. As the explanatory notes
demonstrate, and as is also implicit in the preamble of
the ATA Directive, the EU Commission’s choice was
driven by considerations relating to a level playing
field and legal certainty. In this article we argue, how-
ever, that a directive is not the most suitable instrument
for seeking to achieve these European ambitions. Firstly,
the legal basis of the ATA Directive can be questioned,
and specifically whether this directive, based on Article
115 TFEU, complies with the principle of conferral as
set out in Article 5, paragraphs 1 and 2, TEU. Taxpayers
may request the ECJ to issue a preliminary ruling on
whether the ATA Directive has a valid legal basis.
Although any declaration invalidating a directive will,
in principle, be backdated to the date on which the
directive came into force, several years are likely to
elapse before such a request will be considered and a
ruling issued.
It can also be queried whether the ATA Directive
complies with the principles of subsidiarity and propor-
tionality. The Commission makes it very clear in the
notes, however, that it regards the directive as comply-
ing with both these principles. And given that the ECJ
has so far never honoured a request from a Member
State, the European Parliament, the Council or the EU
Commission to rule an EU legislative act to be invalid on
the grounds of these particular principles, we therefore
also see no prospect of this happening on this occasion.
In addition, we argue that, in view of the subject
matter on the one hand and the effect of the directive
(no reverse vertical effect) on the other hand, the ATA
Directive may limit domestic tax authorities in effec-
tively applying the anti-avoidance measures. This pro-
blem, which is characteristic of a directive, would be
avoided if tax authorities were able to rely on a regula-
tion, which has reverse vertical effect. This is important,
since the initiative to enforce and apply provisions based
on the directive lies primarily with the national tax
authorities and not, in contrast to earlier directives on
direct taxation, with taxpayers.
Another issue remaining open is the question of
how it is planned to ensure that all tax authorities
implement the provisions and also do so uniformly. A
further disadvantage of a directive or regulation based
on Article 115 or Article 352 TFEU respectively is the
absence of public discussion on how the proposal
should be interpreted and the lack of any possibility
to amend the proposal in response to such discussion.
Now the proposal has been adopted by the Council, it
will be difficult to change the new anti-avoidance mea-
sures at a later stage, given that the Commission has
the exclusive right to initiate amendments, while any
amendment proposed also requires the unanimity of
the Member States. As a legal instrument, therefore,
European legislation is relatively inflexible in this
respect.
Questions can similarly be raised regarding the rela-
tionship between the ATA Directive and the Member
States’ existing tax treaties, the EU freedoms and the
directives on direct taxation. With regard to the terms
used in the ATA Directive, we note that although some
of them have been defined, many others have not. The
brevity of the notes provides little assurance in this
respect, while the ECJ will also not attach any impor-
tance to these notes when interpreting the Directive.
This will not help ensure consistent and uniform imple-
mentation in all Member States.
Furthermore, and depending on national courts’ will-
ingness to request preliminary rulings, the ECJ will have
an important role to play in interpreting these provi-
sions. Experience to date with regard to direct taxes has
shown this process sometimes to be littered with obsta-
cles and possible misunderstandings, including pro-
blems relating to correctly explaining the functioning
of a Member State’s domestic tax laws to this court.
This in turn has resulted in some seemingly contradic-
tory judgments. The question, therefore, is whether, in
the event of intervention driven by a wish to improve
the functioning of the internal market, much more
should have and will have to be done to safeguard the
legal certainty of taxpayers, specifically given that com-
petences have not been transferred to the EU in this
area.
72 The EU legislative process bears no resemblance with most domes-
tic legislative process. Reports, Considerations and other support-
ing material has limited binding legal status under EU Law. See
Bruno Peeters, Europees belastingrecht, De Boeck & Larcier, 2005,
pp. 353–354.
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Now the Directive has been adopted, it will be the
Commission’s responsibility to ensure the provisions are
correctly implemented and enforced. Past experience of
infringement and state aid procedures instigated by the
Commission in areas such as direct taxes show that
larger Member States are relatively less likely to face
such procedures. The authors consequently doubt
whether a directive will prove to be a sufficiently effec-
tive instrument for implementing anti-avoidance mea-
sures while also ensuring legal certainty and a level
playing field in Europe. The authors believe that the
same objectives can be achieved through arrange-
ments based on the example of the monitoring
model of the GFTEI. Despite the soft-law nature of
such arrangements, this model would seem to create a
stronger basis for ensuring anti-avoidance measures
are implemented and complied with. Such an
approach would also seem to align more closely
with the sense of EU overreach that many Member
States currently feel.
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